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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL ABROGATION OF STATE
CREATED RULES OF PRIVILEGE IN DIVERSITY CASES:
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501
I. INTRODUCTION
As long as the jurisdiction of federal courts may be invoked on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, there Will exist difficult problems in deline-
ating the precise point at which the constitutional' mandate of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins2 ends and the power of Congress to provide for the orderly
administration of justice in the federal judiciary begins. The recent pro-
mulgation by the Supreme Court of the Federal Rules of Evidence raises a
multitude of questions in this area.
This note constitutes an inquiry into the rather narrow question of the
constitutionality of the treatment the Federal Rules of Evidence would give
state created privileges in diversity cases.4  The analysis found in Parts II
and III herein is nevertheless quite relevant to the question of whether
promulgation by the Court of rules relating to privileges is beyond the con-
gressional grant of authority found in the Rules Enabling Act.5 Part IV
constitutes an attempt to show that, although privileges are substantive
under the analysis submitted in Part II, Congress may constitutionally con-
trol rules of privilege in diversity cases if it so desires.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have, to be sure, encountered consid-
erable difficulty in the Congress. 6  At the time of this writing, it is impos-
1 For the purposes of this note, it is assumed that the Erie doctrine has a constitutional
basis. The debate as to whether this is so, and as to whether the tenth amendment is the
constitutional basis, has been waged elsewhere. See, e.g., the Friendly, Hill, and Keeffe articles,
note 2 infra.
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). At a minimum, the Erie doctrine incorporates a line of cases in-
cluding Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v. Massachusetts Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S.
525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). A comprehensive analysis of the Erie
doctrine is beyond the purview of this article, but many such endeavors are present in the
literature. See, e.g., Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie Versus Hanna, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 377 (1967); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51
VA. L REv. 884 (1964); Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV.
427, 541 (1958); Keeffe, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949); Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
3 Promulgated November 20, 1972, 56 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1972).
4 The Rules purport to be applicable to all cases tried in federal court. See Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 231-32 (1972). The focus of this note is upon those
cases in which state law is the law of decision. These will be denominated "diversity cases"
herein, although it is to be noted that state law has been held applicable in situations other than
true divet'sity cases. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (2d ed. 1970).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). Since the Act provides that rules promulgated pursuant to it
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," the conclusions reached in Parts II
and III, that privileges are substantive and that Hanna does not save the Rules from attack, will,
if correct, settle the issue relating to the Rules Enabling Act.
6 See, e.g., 31 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 340 (Feb. 17, 1973); 31 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 249
(Feb. 3, 1973).
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sible to predict whether the Rules will become effective, and, if so, what
they will finally include. Federal Rule of Evidence 501, as originally
promulgated, will be utilized as a focal point to assist in the inquiry to
which this note is directed. The Rule provides as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or
producing any object or writing.7
Rule 501 would thus purport to abrogate in federal diversity actions any
state created privileges8 which are broader in scope' than those granted by
the Rules.
The practical import of the issue at hand may readily be perceived by
noting two of the changes which would occur should the Federal Rules of
Evidence take effect. Federal Rule of Evidence 504 would permit, in the
physician-patient area, only a privilege between a psychotherapist and his
patient.10 Rule 505 would eliminate the husband-wife privilege of confi-
dential communications, retaining only the right of an accused in a crimi-
nal case to prevent his spouse from testifying against him." To the extent
that these and other Rules would destroy or limit in diversity cases priv-
ileges created by the states, the question arises whether the words of Erie
are in point:
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law appli-
cable in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general" ....
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon
the federal courts. 12
756 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1972).
8 "Privileges," as the tefm is used herein, does not include the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, which of course has its own constitutional provision in the fifth amendment. The Ad-
visory Committee also excludes this privilege from its consideration, see Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1972).
) Since Rule 501 itself is phrased in terms of narrowing permissible privileges, this note is
written in terms of such an effect. The arguments herein respecting this narrowing effect never-
theless have comparable import in those few cases in which the Rules would enlarge an existing
privilege; e.g., F.R. Ev. 509 creates a privilege for the "secrets of state" of the federal govern-
ment.
I' F.R.Ev. 504(b): "A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other pre-
son from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treat-
ment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psy-
chotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction
of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family."
11 F.REv. 505(a): "An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to prevent his spouse
from testifying against him."
12 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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I. THE PRE-RULES ANALYSIS
A. Substantive or Procedural?
The federal courts of appeals have on several occasions considered the
nature of state created privileges under the Erie doctrine. Each time these
courts have held the privileges to be substantive and thereby binding upon
the federal courts under this doctrine." The analysis in most circuits was
perfunctory.14 Only the Second Circuit appears to have carefully scruti-
nized the problem;'" that court argued that the test of Professors Hart and
Wechsler should be applied.'6
The Hart and Wechsler formulation distinguishes between
(a) those rules of law which characteristically and reasonably affect peo-
ple's conduct at the stage of primary private activity and should therefore
be classified as substantive or quasi-substantive, and (b) those rules which
are not of significant importance at the primary stage and should therefore
be regarded as quasi-procedural or procedural. 1 7
Under such a test rules of privilege are substantive. The rationale for
creating privileges includes a state interest in clothing certain relationships
with legally recognized confidentiality. 8  Assuming that privileges actually
fulfill this goal, they encourage persons involved in these favored rela-
tionships to speak more freely in the context of the relationships. Priv-
ileges thus do affect people's conduct at a "primary private activity" period.
Numerous commentators have similarly concluded that rules of privilege
are substantive in nature.'9
The value of the Hart and Wechsler formulation of the substance-
procedure dichotomy may be demonstrated by examining another test ap-
plied in this area. The Supreme Court, in the leading case Hanna v.
13 But see M6naech Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960), discussed in text ac-
company notes 31 and 75 infra.
14 Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972); Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955); Rager, Inc. v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 196 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1952).
15 Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967); Massachusetts
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1962).
16 Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967); Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1962).
17 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL Courrs AND TH FEDEMAL SYSTEM 678
(1953).
18 See text accompanying note 63, infra.
19 See, e.g., Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L REV. 692, 714
(1963); Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction,
56 COLuM. L. REV. 535, 545-46 (1956); Louisell, Confideutidity, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L REV. 101, 102-09 (1956); Green, The Admis-
sibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55 HAIv. L REv. 197, 208-09 (1941). These
articles all antedate Hanna and thus do not include the authors' thoughts on the possible im-
pact of that decision upon federal intervention in the privilege area. See the discussion in Part
III infra.
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Plumer,20 recently borrowed a definition of procedure from Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.,21 a case almost as old as Erie itself:
[Procedure is] the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties rec-
ognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them.22
The difficulty with such a formulation is that a narrow question relat-
ing to the substance-procedure dichotomy, such as that evoked by rules of
privilege, does not fit well within the test. Privileges, as will be discussed
in more detail later, arise from an effort by a legislature or common law
court to clothe certain relationships with confidentiality. Thus it is at least
arguable that recognition within a jurisdiction of a privilege creates, as a
matter of the substantive law of that jurisdiction, an aura of confidentiality
surrounding the privileged relationship. Under this analysis, when a privi-
lege is invoked at trial there may thus be two separate elements of sub-
stantive law involved: the privileged relationship, and, for example, the
tort claim for which the suit was brought. How, then, shall the Sibbach
test be applied? From the point of view of the tort claim, the privilege
is merely part of the "judicial process for enforcing rights and duties rec-
ognized by the substantive [torti law" of the jurisdiction. But from the
point of view of the privileged relationship, the privilege is itself one of
the rights recognized by the substantive law of the jurisdiction. Depend-
ing entirely upon the perspective of the inquiry, then, a rule of privilege is,
or is not, procedural under the Sibbach test.
It is interesting at this point to examine the argument proffered by the
Advisory Committee relating to rules of privilege and the substance-pro-
cedure dichotomy. Against the overwhelming weight of authority indi-
cating that such rules are substantive, the Committee reasons as follows:
As to the question of "substance," it is true that a privilege commonly
represents an aspect of a relationship created and defined by a State...
However, in litigation involving the relationship itself, the privilege is not
ordinarily one of the issues .... The reality of the matter is that privilege
is called into operation, not when the relation giving rise to the privilege
is being litigated, but when the litigation involves something substantively
devoid of relation to the privilege. The appearance of privilege in the case
is quite by accident, and its effect is to block off the tribunal from a source
of information. Thus its real impact is on the method of proof in the
case, and in comparison any substantive aspect appears tenuous. 24
20 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
21312 U.S. 1 (1941).
22 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965), quoting from Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
-2 See text accompanying note 63 infra.2 4 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 233 (1972). The Committee of-
fers the argument as a "significant policy factor," not a constitutional argument, since the Com-
mittee earlier assumes that Hanna settles the constitutional questions. See text accompanying
note 61 infra.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
This cryptic statement does not lend itself to ready analysis, -but at least two
observations should be made regarding it.
First, the Committee may be falling into the trap of the Sibbach test
when it argues that the "real impact" of a privilege is on the "method of
proof in the case." Again, from the perspective of the claim being liti-
gated in the case, the privilege may appear to be merely a procedural tool.
But to state the label, "method of prqof," is to state the conclusion; such
terminology is singularly unhelpful in the substance-procedure inquiry.
The "real impact" of a rule of privilege is as much upon the extra-judicial
confidential relationship sought to be protected by the privilege as it is
upon the particular trial at which the privilege is invoked.
Second, the Committee emphasizes the fact that a rule of privilege is
ordinarily not applied when the litigation involves the confidential rela-
tionship itself and that it, therefore, must be procedural. The attorney-
client privilege, for example, is not created by the state to protect the client
from a later action by the attorney for services rendered. The state in ef-
fect balances the need for the privilege against the need of the attorney to
recover and decides in favor of the latter.25  But of what relevance to the
substance-procedure inquiry is this exception to the application of rules of
privilege? The fact that a state must balance one substantive provision
against another, and that it decides in favor of the latter, does not make
the former any less substantive in nature. Otherwise, a decision by the
state that privilege may be invoked in a suit by an attorney for services
rendered would relegate the law of contracts to the domain of procedure.
Nor may it be said that the state interest in promoting confidential rela-
tionships is limited to cases in which those relationships are the subject of
litigation; these are the very cases in which the state, as the Committee
notes, tends not to permit the application of rules of privilege. The argu-
ment which the Committee offers in the face of substantial authority is,
at best, unpersuasive.
B. State Created Privileges under Rule 43(a)
Assuming, then, that state created privileges are substantive, is evidence
so privileged nevertheless admissible in a diversity case under the present
federal evidence rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a) ? The Rule
is phrased in terms of admissibility, not exclusion, and provides two
grounds other than state law upon which evidence may be admitted.2"
Conceivably, if these two alternative grounds of admissibility had sufficient
2 5 See C. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE 91 (2d ed. 1972).
26 F.R. CIV. P. 43(a) provides, in part, as follows:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United
States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United
States on the hearing of suits in equity, or undet' the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In
any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs. ....
(Vol. 34
thrust, Rule 43 (a) itself would provide a means of circumventing state
created privileges and the constitutional issues discussed in this note would
have arisen long before Federal Evidence Rule 501 came upon the scene.
The two alternative grounds of admissibility under Rule 43 (a) have
no such thrust. The first ground, relating to evidence otherwise admissible
under federal statute, invokes no statutes applicable in the privilege area2
The second ground, relating to evidence admissible "heretofore" in fed-
eral courts sitting as courts of equity, is similarly unhelpful. One com-
mentator has argued that the practice "heretofore" was simply to follow
the state rules,28 while another has concluded that the practice "hereto-
fore" is no longer discernible.29
The practice in federal courts to date, as noted earlier,80 has been to
hold rules of privilege binding upon federal courts. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Monarch Insurance Co. v.
Spach,8" did avoid application of a state exclusionary rule 2 by application
of the second element of Rule 43(a), but, as Professor Wright has ob-
served,88 the refusal of the court of appeals to apply the state rule in
Spach actually enhanced the state policy underlying the rule. The Fifth
Circuit has, in a recent case, summarily applied a state created privilege.84
To the extent that a rule such as Federal Rule of Evidence 501 would
purport to alter the federal practice, grounded upon the Erie doctrine, of
honoring state created rules of privilege, serious constitutional issues arise.
One question which arises at this point is whether the dictum of Hanna v.
Plumer8 would save such a rule from constitutional attack.
III. THE IMPACT OF HANNA
A. The Hanna Decision
It might be expected that the constitutional doubts surrounding any
purported federal displacement of state created privileges would not van-
ish simply by virtue of the context of the federal entry into the field. Nev-
27 "Here the practitioner will receive little aid except from the statutes prescribing how
proof of public records may be made, and the federal 'shop-book' statute, 28 USC § 1732." 5
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 5 43.04, at 1332 (2d ed. 1971) (foomotes omitted).
28 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 5 43.07, at 1356 (2d ed. 1971).
2 9 Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the Communication Privileged Under State Law: An Analysis of
Confusion, 7 VAND. L. REV. 556, 569 (1954).
8 0 See cases cited in notes 14 and 15 supra.
81281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). This case is discussed in more detail in the text accompany-
ing note 75 infr.
32 Although the state statute discussed in Spach did not actually create a privilege, the Fifth
Circuit treated it as such. See note 76 infra.
33 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 414 (2d ed. 1970). See Monarch Insurance Co. v. Spach,
281 F.2d 401, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1960).
34 Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1972).
85 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
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ertheless, the Advisory Committee,3 6 Professor Wright,37 and others8
would appear to argue that the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence
will take effect, if at all, in the same manner as did the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure obviates any constitutional difficulties with the new rules.
Citing the leading case Hanna v. Plumer,9 these authorities submit that
any rules in effect by virtue of "the triumvirate 40 are constitutional. Others
caution that Hanna may not be so broad a grant of authority.41
In Hanna the defendant in a diversity case, while conceding that ser-
vice of process by the plaintiff was sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d) (1), argued that the more restrictive state service rule
was substantive in nature and therefore should control under the Erie doc-
trine. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed
with the defendant's argument that the Massachusetts rule requiring per-
sonal service of process upon an executor within one year after he had
posted bond served substantive state goals and therefore governed in the
case.' 2 The Supreme Court based its reversal upon two separate but related
modes of analysis.
Under its first mode of analysis, the Court decided that upon the
facts of Hanna, service of process was procedural, not substantive. The
Court was at this point concerned that Rule 4(d) (1) be within the En-
abling Act's admonition that rules promulgated by the Court not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right."43  Using the test of Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.44 to separate substance from procedure, the Court found
the rule to be within the Act. The Court went on to say that 'it was
"doubtful" that, under Erie, the Massachusetts rule would govern.45 Later
still the Court observed that
it is difficult to argue that permitting service of defendant's wife to take the
place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of enforce-
36Advisory Committee's Note to F.R. Ev. 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 232-33 (1972).
a7 Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 572-74(1967). Professor Wright in this article argues against the entry of the federal government into
the privilege area but accepts Hanna as alleviating any constitutional problems in such an entry.
38 See, e.g., Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CoR-
NELL L. Q. 377 (1967); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA.
L. REv. 884 (1965).
39 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
40 That is, the Advisofy Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress,
41 See, eg.., Siegel, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie Implemented, Not Retarded, 54
A.B.A.J. 172 (1968); Knowlton, The Impact of Erie Upon the Federal Rules, 17 S. C. L REV.
480, 485-86 (1965); Note, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1284-86 (1968); Note, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1139, 1151-52 (1967).
4Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
43 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
44312 U.S. 1 (1941).
45380 U.S. at 466-67.
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ment of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently "substantial" to raise the
sort of equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.46
It is clear that at this point the Court had resolved the Hanna dispute;
the Court had twice indicated that an Erie problem does not exist in the
case, because the rule is procedural. Yet, the Court went on in several
paragraphs to provide the dictum which has led many to assume the per se
constitutionality of all federal rules.
Under its second mode of analysis, described herein as the Hanna dic-
tum, the Court indicated that the Erie doctrine is not the appropriate test
to apply to a challenged Federal Rule of Civil Procedure4r and continued
with this oft-quoted language:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules [of Civil Proce-
dure], the question facing the couit is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal
Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court,
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question
trespasses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restric-
tions.48
It is with the support of this language that the Advisory Committee may
make the following bold statement:
[T]he [new federal evidence] rules avoid giving state privileges the ef-
fect which substantial authority has thought necessary and proper. Regard-
less of what might once have been thought to be the command of [Erie]
as to observance of state created privileges in diversify cases, [Hanna] is
believed to locate the problem in the area of choice rather than necessity.49
B. On Limiting Hanna
If the Hanna dictum were so broad as some would have us believe,50
there would be little purpose to the present article; the sole question these
authorities would raise is whether a rule were in effect as a federal rule.
In fact, if Hanna is so broad as one commentator argues,51 Erie itself has
been overruled, so that there is little with which to attack a rule such as
Rule 501 in the first place. It is submitted that these readings of the
Hanna dictum are too expansive and that Hanna v. Plumer, insofar as it
relates to the Federal Rules of Evidence, should be read with several lim-
iting factors in mind.
46 Id. at 469 (footnotes omitted).
47 Id. at 469-70.
48 Id. at 471 (footnotes omitted).
49 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 232-33 (1972) (emphasis sup-
plied).
50 See the authorities cited in notes 36 through 38 supra.
51 See Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 377 (1967).
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First, and perhaps most obvious, it should be remembered that the
Hanna Court was concerned with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
not the Federal Rules of Evidence. The differences between the two are
twofold. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been in existence for
over a quarter of a century at the time Hanna was decided. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, on the other hand, are a fresh and untested venture
into a field previously left largely to state law. The Civil Rules thus com-
mand a degree of respect which the Rules of Evidence will attain, if ever,
only after a number of years of use in the federal courts. The other ma-
jor distinction between the two sets of rules is that by the time of Hanna
many of the states themselves had stamped the Civil Rules with their ap-
proval by adopting the Rules in whole or in part;52 no. such claim may be
made at this time regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus both the
age of the Civil Rules and their acceptability to the states may have made
the talk in Hanna of prima facie constitutionality rather cheap. Such
language in connection with the fledgling evidence rules would be another
thing entirely.
The second factor to be kept in mind in applying Hanna to the Federal
Rules of Evidence is that if the Hanna dictum is read literally it runs
counter to a long-standing rule of constitutional interpretation, that of
avoidance of premature and unnecessary decisions. 53  Two of the evils
usually associated with such decisions are lack of lower court decisions on
the matter and lack of specific fact patterns on which to decide the consti-
tutional issues. Both of these evils exist if the Hanna dictum is read to
"constitutionalize" anything appearing in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Such an interpretation would mean that the promulgation of federal rules
is actually the writing of a textbook on constitutional law, delineating with
a single stroke of the pen constitutional boundaries heretofore undefined.
The Court has repeatedly refused to permit such premature and unneces-
sary decisions,54 and there is no reason, except the unfortunate language in
Hanna, to assume it intends to retreat from this principle."
The third, and perhaps most important, factor to be kept in mind in
applying the Hanna dictum to the Federal Rules of Evidence is that it is
52 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE--IMPACT ON STATE PROCEDURE (A PRELIMINARY SURVEY) (1962); Silverstein, Adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Discovery in State Practice, 11 KAN. L. REV. 213 (1962).
53 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). See also Bernard, Avoid-
ance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amend-
ment, 50 MICH. L. REV. 261 (1951); Frankfutter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1002 (1924).
54 See cases cited in note 53, supra.
55 Again, it may be that in the context of dealing with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the
Court was more willing to abandon this principle than it would be in the context of newly prom-
ulgated, untested rules.
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tied inextricably to the substance-procedure dichotomy. Not only did the
Court first decide the issue in Hanna on the grounds of this dichotomy,5"
but the Court plainly founded its dictum upon the same:
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by
the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either.57
The Hanna dictum retains the distinction between substance and proce-
dure, and if rules of privilege are not "rationally capable of classification
as either," Hanna is of no help whatever in supporting the constitutional-
ity of a rule such as Rule 501.
The obvious rejoinder to this observation is that, since the Advisory
Committee, the Court, and Congress are comprised of rational men, the
Rules, as a joint effort of these groups, must be rationally capable of classi-
fication as substantive or procedural.5 The fallacy in this argument is
that it assumes that each of the elements of the "triumvirate" will exam-
ine carefully each of the proposed rules from the perspective of whether
it is procedural. There is little to suggest that this examination actually
occurs. Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the November 20, 1972,
order promulgating the Rules, made the following observations:
[Tlhis Court does not write the Rules, nor supervise their writing, nor ap-
praise them on their merits, weighing the pros and cons. The Court con-.
cededly is a mere conduit. Those who write the Rules are members of a
Committee named by the Judicial Conference. The members are eminent;
but they are the sole judges of the merits of the proposed Rules, our ap-
proval being merely perfunctory. In other words, we are merely the con-
duit to Congress.59
If the members of the Advisory Committee are the "sole judges of the
merits of the proposed Rules," it would appear from the Committee's Note
-to Rule 501 that the Committee has ill-performed its duty respecting the
Hanna procedural-substantive determination. The Committee, in its only
reference to Hanna in that Note, makes the following statement:
Regardless of what might once have been thought to be the command of
[Erie] as to observance of state created privileges in diversity cases,
[Hanna] is believed to locate the problem in the area of choice rather than
necessity.60
This hardly fulfills the Hanna expectation that members of the Advisory
56 See the text accompanying notes 43 through 46, supra.
57 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
58 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
59 56 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
60 Advisory Committee's Note to F.R. Ev. 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 232-33 (1972).
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Committee, functioning in their capacity as reasonable men, would decide
that the Rules are rationally capable of classification as procedural.
Rather, it appears from this statement that the Committee read Hanna to
grant them sweeping authority to write rules of evidence regardless of
whether the Committee considered them procedural or substantive. Put
briefly, if the Committee did not seriously consider whether Rule 501 is
capable of classification as procedural, the Hanna dictum is not supportive
of the Rule's constitutionality.
Against this it might be argued that the Committee, as seen earlier in
this note,(" did proffer an argument that state created privileges are not
substantive. The Committee, however, submits this argument only after
deciding that Hanna makes the Committee's decision on the matter a "prob-
lem of choice rather than necessity." Furthermore, the argument is sub-
mitted by the Committee as a "significant policy factor" in the Committee's
choice, not as an argument of constitutional dimensions under Hanna.
Finally, the argument which the Committee does make is, as has been ar-
gued herein, "2 somewhat less than compelling, even under a test of ration-
ality.
The considerations listed above are an indication that Hanna writes less
than a blank check in the area of the constitutionality of rules created by
the "triumvirate." It is not submitted here that Rule 501 would in fact be
unconstitutional, but rather that a constitutional challenge to the Rule
would not simply evaporate upon the murmuring of the words "Hanna v.
Plumer." The balance of this note will be devoted to an effort to show,
in a manner other than mere reliance upon the Hanna dictum, the constitu-
tionality of federal control of privileges recognized in diversity cases.
IV. AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL CONTROL OF
RULES OF PRIVILEGE IN DWERSITY CASES
A. The Unique Nature of Rules of Privilege
It is submitted that the conclusion that rules of privilege are sub-
stantive does not settle the issue of whether federal control of rules of
privilege in diversity cases is constitutional. By examining the nature of
rules of privilege and thereby discovering the substantial interest which
any system of justice has in whether it shall recognize such privileges, it
may be demonstrated that the interest of the federal government in the
administration of justice by the judiciary which it has created outweighs
even the interests of federalism which lie at the heart of the Erie doctrine.
It is at the outset crucial to note the justification commonly given for
the creation of rules of privilege. The standard rationale is that a given
6 1 See text accompanying notes 24 and 25 supra.
62 Id.
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legislature or common law court, in creating a privilege, has balanced the
value of providing a particular relationship with legally recognized confi-
dentiality against the value of having a full disclosure of evidence in any
given case and has decided in favor of providing confidentiality. 3 Clear-
ly, such a decision concerning this "privilege trade-off" has significant ram-
ifications upon the integrity of the court system involved. The more privi-
leges recognized by a court system and the broader the scope accorded
those privileges, the greater potentiality for individual injustice in the
trial courts of that system.
Viewed in this light, rules of privilege differ significantly from other
rules of evidence. The-hearsay rule, the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
the firsthand knowledge rule, the best evidence rule, and virtually all the
other commonly recognized rules of evidence have evolved as attempts to
ensure that the trier of fact will have the most reliable evidence before it
when resolving a dispute. These evidentiary rules exist to promote a fair
resolution of the issues at trial, not to deny such a resolution in the name
of a "higher" concern. One parallel in the evidentiary field to rules of
privilege is the exclusionary rule applied in criminal cases when evidence
has been obtained unconstitutionally by the state. The criticisms which
have been leveled of late at the exclusionary rule6 are some indication of
the problems which arise when a judicial system recognizes rules of evi-
dence grounded upon a concern other than that of a fair and truthful res-
olution of the issues at trial.
Nor is the privilege trade-off decision the same, in kind or degree, as
other decisions which, although made by the states, have been held to be
binding upon the federal courts under the Erie doctrine. For example,
both the question of whether strict liability in tort is available in a diver-
sity case and the question of whether to apply state statutes of limitation in
diversity cases have been held to fall within the dictates of Erie."5 A ques-
63 See, e.g., McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (1937) (Learned Hand, J.); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EvIDENc § 2285 (McNaujhton rev. 1961); Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and
Privi!ege, 4 Air. L. Rnv. 377 (1950); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evi-
dence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447 (1938).
The fact that the Advisory Committee performed such a balancing test is evident from the
following statement by a member of the Committee:
[rJf a modern trial is to be in fact a diligent search for truth, with full disclosure of all
facts both beneficial and advefse, then there is real doubt whether any privilege to hide
the truth should be recognized. Those privileges which remain in the proposed Rules
reflect Committee judgment that in some instances the public good is better served by
recognizing the transcendant need for confidentiality.
Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15
WAYNE L REv. 1061, 1073 (1969).
6 4 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
65 The question of whether' to apply strict liability in tort is a substantive one and is governed
by the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 (N.D.
Ind. 1965). State statutes of limitation have been held to control in diversity cases. See, e.g.,
Ragan v. Massachusetts Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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tion of substantive law, such as whether strict liability in tort exists in a
given jurisdiction, relates to what claims are to be recognized. Rules of
privilege, on the other hand, relate to what claims, otherwise worthy under
the law of the jurisdiction as defined by the lawmakers of that jurisdiction,
a party may be able to establish in the individual case. The distinction
runs to the heart of the integrity of any judicial system recognizing privi-
leges; on the one hand the litigant is told that he has no recognizable legal
claim or defense, while on the other he is told that he has such a claim or
defense but simply may not be able to prove it.
The question of the applicability of state statutes of limitation in di-
versity cases is also distinguishable from the privilege trade-off decision.
Statutes of limitation are the result of a legislative balancing of the need
to terminate civil liability at some point in time against the right to recover.
The difference between this trade-off and the privilege trade-off is that stat-
utes of limitation generally provide the litigant with room to work within
their framework, while rules of privilege bar the litigant's right to recover
regardless of his own actions. Since the litigant against whom the privi-
lege is invoked may not avoid its application, rules of privilege should be
of greater concern to a judicial system than statutes of limitation.
B. Federal Power to Control Rules of Privilege in Federal Courts
The above discussion tends to show the unique significance of rules of
privilege to any judicial system which recognizes them. Against this back-
ground, the question of the degree of control of the federal government
over the federal judicial system may be examined. To do this, it is help-
ful to turn to another Supreme Court decision.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op " was a workman's compen-
sation case arising under a South Carolina statute and reaching federal
court as a diversity case. The Supreme Court held that the issue of fact
relating to the defense of the electric cooperative, although clearly one for
the court under state law, must nevertheless be submitted to the jury since
the action was brought in federal court.67 While expressly declining to
ground its decision upon the seventh amendment,68 the Court indicated
that the "federal system is an independent system for administering jus-
tice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction." 9 Further, the Court
found a "strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the
judge-jury relationship in the federal courts. ' 70  The Byrd case is thus au-
thority for the proposition that an independent interest of the federal
o6 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
671d. at 533-40.
68 Id. at 537 n.10.
69 Id. at 537 (emphasis supplied).
701d. at 538.
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court system may be invoked in a diversity case to avoid a state policy of
less than constitutional dimensions.
The privilege trade-off arguably has a greater impact upon the integrity
of the federal judicial system than has the judge-jury relationship protected
in Byrd. The Court in Byrd noted numerous factors at work in the fed-
eral system which greatly increased the chances that the result of the liti-
gation would be the same whether the fact issue were submitted to the
judge or to the jury.71 The privilege trade-off, on the other hand, is an
overt decision accepting the probability that the application of rules of
privilege to some cases will cause a result opposite the one which would
occur had all relevant facts been divulged at trial. In a system of juris-
prudence which places a high value upon the accurate resolution of dis-
puted facts, privileges are thus more central to the integrity of the judi-
cial system than is the judge-jury relationship. In the sense of the rela-
tive import, as regards the fact-finding process, of privileges vis-A-vis the
judge-jury relationship, Byrd is strong authority for finding a federal power
to abrogate state created privileges in diversity cases.
The Byrd decision is at most only analagous to the privilege question,
however. The Byrd question of whether the fact issue in that case was to
be determined by the court or by the jury was not substantive in the sense
that term has been used in this note;72 Byrd was not, therefore, a decision
which gave rise to Erie considerations. Privileges, it has been argued here-
in, are substantive and therefore fall, initially at least, within the Erie
doctrine.
Assuming, as was assumed earlier in this note,73 that Erie was a consti-
tutional decision, the question of federal control of privileges in diversity
cases nevertheless remains open if an independent constitutional ground
exists to permit such control. It is here submitted that the power of Con-
gress to administrate the federal court system, a power which flows nat-
urally from the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to create such
a system,74 constitutes such a ground. The unique nature of rules of priv-
ilege, as indicated earlier, relates to the peculiarly significant impact which
such rules have upon the integrity of the judicial system which recognizes
them. The constitutional power of Congress to administrate the federal
judiciary, while not negativing the dictates of Erie in the broad sense,
should serve to control in a matter which relates so significantly to the
integrity of the federal judicial system. The problem of competing consti-
tutional concerns in this area is rather easily resolved if the constitu-
tutional basis of Erie is the tenth amendment, since that amendment re-
serves to the states only those powers not expressly delegated the federal
711d. at 540.
72 See text accompanying notes 13 through 25 supra.
7 3 See note 1 supra.
74 U.S. CONST. art. 1, r8, C. 9.
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government. If Erie is based upon a constitutional provision other than
the tenth amendment, it would be necessary to balance that other provision
against the article I power of Congress in order to resolve the question
raised by this analysis of the import of rules of privilege.
After Byrd was decided the Fifth Circuit was faced with a problem in
many ways similar to the one at hand. In Monarch Insurance Co. v.
Spach75 the Court of Appeals confronted the question of whether, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), evidence was admissible in a di-
versity case even though expressly barred by a statute of the state whose
law controlled the decision. The Florida statute in question prohibited the
admission of a written statement given by an injured person unless at
the time the statement was taken the declarant was provided a copy there-
of.76 Relying heavily upon the Byrd decision, the Court of Appeals de-
cided that the federal interests countervailing the state interests should
govern. Judge Brown reasoned,
Not the least of these countervailing considerations is the indispensible
necessity that a tribunal, if it is to be an independent court administering
law, must have the capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be
tried and facts are to be presented in the search for the truth of the cause.
... A United States District Court clothed with a power by Congress pur-
suant to the Constitution is not a mere adjunct to a state's judicial machin-
ery.77
The Fifth Circuit thus found in the federal courts themselves a power to
override state rules of privilege.78  If Rule 501 ever takes effect under the
authority of Congress, such an argument will be strengthened.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been argued herein that state created rules of privilege, although
substantive under the Erie doctrine, are of such a nature as to have pecu-
liarly significant ramifications upon the administration of justice in the
federal court system and may therefore be controlled by Congress under
its constitutional authority to create that system. The Congress, as the
constitutional guardian of "an independent system for administering jus-
tice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction," 7 ought not be forced
75 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
76 FLA. STAT.A~N ". § 92.33 (1959). Although the Flofida statute did not create a rule of
privilege per se, the court of appeals noted that the policy of the statute was "like that of a con-
fidential privilege," id. at 412, and treated the statute as if it created a substantive right under
Florida law.
7T 281 F.2d at 407. The court went on to admit the evidence under the "courts of equity"
element of F.R. CIrV. P. 43 a); see text accompanying note 31 supra.
78 The Second Circuit, citing Byrd, has alluded to such an inherent power in the federal courts.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962). The
limits of relying upon the Spach decision have been noted earlier. See text accompanying notes
33 and 34 supra.
79 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op, 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
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by another constitutional provision to accept the dictates of the states in
this unique situation. The -hand of Erie should not reach so far.
Douglas W. Vanscoy*
Editorial Associate, Maek B. Cohn.
